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1. INTRODUCTION 
Broadly there are two theories about the determinants of maturity of credit in a 
financial system. These two theories are related to the power of creditors and 
information availability. The pioneers and proponents of the first theory are 
Townsend (1979), Aghion and Bolton (1992), and Hart and Moore (1999). The 
power theory of creditors postulate that if creditors are powerful, can enforce 
contracts through judicial system at lower cost and in a short time, get hold of the 
collateral, or get control of the firm, they will be more willing to increase volume and 
maturity of loans. On the other hand, the information theory emphasises on the 
importance of availability of information about the borrower in the lending decisions. 
It suggests that lenders will not be too much worried about adverse selection 
problems if adequate information is available. The second theory was developed by 
Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).   
Inefficient judicial system lowers the probability of loan’s recovery from 
opportunistic borrowers or those borrowers who are in financial distress. This 
probability sinks further low when the loan has a long maturity. In case of short-term 
loans, lenders can monitor and review the behaviour and financial health of the 
borrowers at frequent intervals and may refuse to renew the loan upon maturity if the 
need arises. This ability of the short-term lenders reduces the need of using judicial 
system for loan recovery. In contrast, lender of long-term loans will have to wait until 
the maturity of the loan i.e. cannot call back the loan before maturity even if he knows 
that the financial health of the borrower is deteriorating with the passage of time. This 
means that lenders of long-term loans cannot employ the early preventive measures of 
defaults like the lenders of short-term loans do. Rather long-term lenders will have to 
resort to a court of law if the borrower defaults at the time of maturity. Resultantly, the 
law protecting the rights of the lenders and the judicial system enforcing the loan 
contracts will be one of the major determinants of long-term financing. Based on the 
above arguments, it is hypothesised that the maturity of a firm’s debts is positively 
correlated with efficiency of justice.  
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In the presence of inefficient judicial system that makes the enforcement of 
contracts difficult or costly, lenders will prefer to issue short-term debt than long-term 
debt. Short-term debt leaves borrowers with little opportunity to indulge in activities that can 
create moral hazards for creditors [Diamond (1991, 1993); Rajan (1992)]. Specifically, when 
the maturity of debt is short, borrowers have limited time for opportunistic behaviour. If 
they violate the terms and conditions of the loan contract, creditors will review their 
behaviour upon maturity of the loan, and if necessary, may deny renewal of the credit. 
Such frequent monitoring lowers the probability of greater losses, which is not possible in 
long-term loans because in long-term loans the borrowers have sufficiently long period 
during which their opportunistic behaviour may increase the probability of default to a 
greater extent.  
The objective of this paper is to test hypotheses derived from the above discussion, 
using corporate financial data and judicial efficiency data collected from judicial districts 
of Pakistan. Specifically, we test two broader hypotheses. The first hypothesis to be 
tested is that short-term financing ratio will be higher where judicial efficiency is low. 
And the second hypothesis to be tested is that the straight-forward relationship between 
judicial efficiency and debt-maturity as portrayed above can be moderated or 
strengthened by several firm-specific variables such as firm size and the ratio of fixed 
assets-to-total assets. The second hypothesis is based on the information asymmetry 
problems and the fact that some firm-specific features are additional guarantees that a 
firm will not default on its loan. Since lending to undesirable borrowers is more costly in 
an inefficient judicial system, information availability about borrowers is crucial in 
lending decisions where judicial efficiency is low. When lenders cannot effectively 
distinguish between desirable and undesirable borrowers due to asymmetric information, 
lenders rely on some firm characteristics to derive information about the borrowers. 
Specifically, firm size and availability of collateral can eliminate or mitigate problems 
engendered by asymmetric information [Magri (2006)].  
The above two hypotheses suggest that debt-maturity of a firm depends not only 
on the institutional settings around the firm, but also on the firm specific characteristics 
and the interaction between firm-specific and institutional features.  
The motivation for this research comes from the observation of a large number 
of firms with negative equity figures, and yet a few cases of forced bankruptcies 
among Pakistani listed firms. The firms with negative equity figures are presumably 
in financial distress. Theoretically, the large number of firms in financial distress 
should have led to a higher incidence of forced bankruptcies. However, data from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) show that cases of forced 
bankruptcies are negligible.  The question is “why do creditors of the financially-
distressed firms hesitate to go to court against these firms in Pakistan and force their 
liquidation through judicial process?” One explanation might be that the judicial 
system is inefficient and the court process is slow and costly in Pakistan. The 
empirical research shows support for this argument. For example, Claessens, 
Djankov, and Klapper (2003) used data of 1472 listed firms in five East Asian 
countries and found that judicial efficiency was an important determinant of whether 
creditors forced firms into liquidation or not. They argue that creditors use judicial 
system for firms’ bankruptcies only when they know that the loan features and 
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judicial process present good probability of recovery of the loan amount. A direct 
measure of judicial efficiency in one country relative to other countries is provided 
by the World Bank in its “Doing Business” report which is published annually to 
present various analytical accounts of a country’s business environment such as how 
easy or difficult it is to start business in the country, to get credit, to enforce 
contracts and many other aspects of doing business. The “Doing Business 2010: 
Pakistan” ranks Pakistan 158 out of 183 countries for overall contract enforcement. 
The report shows that average number of days taken by courts in resolving 
commercial disputes is 978 days and cost is 23.8 percent of the claim. The 
comparative statistics in the report show that Pakistan is too low on the ranking scale 
when compared to good countries that have best practices.  
Both the negligible number of forced bankruptcies and the World Bank report 
“Doing Business 2010: Pakistan” indicate that judicial efficiency is low across the board 
in Pakistan. But it is reasonable to expect that judicial efficiency will vary across 
different districts because of demand pressure and limited judicial resources in these 
districts. If judicial efficiency is low or high in different districts in Pakistan, has it 
anything to do with the pattern of financing of listed firms in these districts? Both 
theoretical and empirical research imply that content and enforcement of law have both 
direct and indirect impact on the financial structures of firms. With all of the above facts 
and assumptions, Pakistan is a good candidate for testing the impact of within-country 
judicial efficiency on various aspects of corporate financial decisions. Thus, this study 
exploits the variation in judicial efficiency across different districts of Pakistan and 
relates these variations to corporate financial decisions.  Specifically, this study quantifies 
the impact of judicial inefficiency on debt-maturity structure. Additionally, this paper 
will also help in answering the question that why corporate short-term financing ratio is 
high in Pakistan as reported in several studies such as Shah and Khan (2009), Shah and 
Khan (2007), and Shah and Hijazi (2004). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In next section, we review the extant 
literature and draw implication of poor judicial process for debt maturity decisions. Also 
in this section, we discuss control variables that have widely been identified as 
determinants of debt-maturity structure. In Section 3, we discuss the model 
specifications. Section 4 presents and discusses results of the empirical models. And 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, FIRM-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS  
AND DEBT-MATURITY 
Besides the direct relationship between debt-maturity and judicial efficiency as 
discussed in the Introduction, several firm-specific attributes determine the maturity 
structure of a firm’s debt. At the same time, these attributes serve as intervening variables 
to change the role played by judicial efficiency in debt-maturity structure. For firm 
specific variables, there are four major theories that try to explain the maturity-structure 
of a firm’s debts. These theories are the agency theory, the maturity-matching theory, the 
signalling and liquidity risk theory, and the tax advantage theory. The proxies suggested 
by these theories and philosophical arguments in support of these proxies are discussed 
next.   
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2.1.1.  Firm Size 
Smith and Warner (1979) argue that smaller firms face higher agency costs 
because shareholders and creditors in these firms have more conflicts due to risk shifting 
and claim dilution. Short-term debt can be an effective tool to control such agency costs 
[Barnea, et al. (1980)]. Furthermore, small firm do not have as much information in hard 
form as large firms do because it is relatively costly for small firms to generate and 
distribute information [Pettit and Singer (1985)]. Lack of information creates severe 
information asymmetry problem for small firms. The information asymmetry limits the 
ability of small firms to access capital market for long-term debt. Besides the above, 
Easterwood and Kadapakkam (1994) argues that small firms cannot access capital 
markets for long-term debt because large-fixed-flotation costs of fixed securities render 
this option less economical for them.  
 
2.1.2 Firm Size and Judicial Efficiency 
In the presence of asymmetric information problems, lenders are usually more 
exposed to adverse selection problems. The expected costs of adverse selection are high 
when judicial efficiency is low. Since information asymmetry problem is severe with 
small firms as mentioned above, lenders will hesitate to advance long-term loans to small 
firms.  
Moreover, Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that large firms can withstand large 
negative external shocks because they are more diversified and have large capital base. 
This is why the expected probability of financial distress of large firms is lower than the 
small firms. Recovering loan from a financially-distressed firm requires the involvement 
of judiciary. If judicial process is costly or inefficient, long-term loans to small firms will 
not be easily available.  
Both of the above arguments about firm size suggest that judicial efficiency could 
impact small firms more. Where judicial efficiency is low, small firms will have more 
short-term loans on their balance sheets. There is some empirical evidence to support the 
above arguments. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) studied empirically the 
maturity of firms’ liabilities in thirty developed and developing countries over the period 
1980-1991. They showed that only large firms had higher long-term external financing to 
total assets in countries where judicial efficiency was higher. They found that the effect 
was also economically very significant. For example, the size of the coefficient suggested 
that the incremental effect of judicial efficiency on debt-maturity was 0.25.  
 
2.1.3.  Assets Maturity, Collateral and Judicial Efficiency 
Myers (1977) suggests that solution to the well-known under-investment problem 
of agency theory is to match the maturity of a firm’s debt to that of its assets. The 
maturity matching makes it sure that payments of loan are scheduled to correspond with 
the decline in the value of assets in place. It suggests that current assets should be 
financed with short-term debt and long-term assets with long-term debt. Stohs and Mauer 
(1996) also suggest maturity matching but give a different explanation. They say that 
when a firm has longer maturity of assets than that of its debt, the cash flow from its 
assets will not be sufficient to meet the debt obligation. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) add another aspect of asset maturity in relation to debt maturity. They suggest that 
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fixed assets facilitate borrowing by serving as collateral. The above arguments suggest 
that a positive relationship is expected between the ratio of fixed-assets-to-total-assets 
and the maturity structure of debt.  
 
2.1.4.  Collateral and Judicial Efficiency 
As argued in the preceding section 2.1.2, collateral solves many asymmetric 
information problems in credit contracts, such as issues related to project valuation, 
uncertainty about quality of the project, riskiness of the borrower, and moral hazards. As 
collateral mitigates the severity of these issues, the impact of judicial inefficiency could 
not be the same on the debt-maturity of firms that have more fixed assets to offer as 
collateral for the loan as compared to firms that have few fixed assets.  
 
2.1.5.  Growth Opportunities 
Myers (1977) identified some unique circumstance where a firm might abandon 
positive NPV projects in the presence of risky debt. This is phenomenon was named as 
the underinvestment problem. He suggested that underinvestment problems can be 
controlled with short-term debt because the debt will mature before the expiration of the 
growth options. His arguments imply a negative relationship between debt-maturity and 
the firm’s growth rate.  Consistent with the above, Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and 
Opler (1996), Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) and Varouj, Ying, and Jiaping (2005) all 
find a negative relationship between proxies for growth and corporate debt maturity.  
For the measurement of growth variable, previous research studies have used both 
book-value and market-value based approaches. This paper prefers the book value-based 
approach (geometric mean of the annual percentage increase in assets). The reason why 
we prefer book value approach is that the data period covers the years 2001 to 2006. KSE 
experienced a phenomenal increase in 2002 and onward. The market-value based proxy 
might unnecessarily indicate that the listed companies experienced abnormal growth in 
2002 and onward. In contrast, the book-value approach provides a stable measure of 
growth. Under book-value approach, growth opportunities are denoted by the variable 
GROWTHi, which is a time series mean of annual percentage increases in the total assets 
of a firm. The time series mean of annual percentage increases in the assets of firm i is 
calculated to smooth the year-to-year extreme variations. This is why the variable 
GROWTHi changes in cross-sections but remains constant over time for firm i.  
 
2.1.6.  Firm Quality 
Flannery (1986) stated that debt maturity can be used as a signalling device. Since 
frequency of monitoring increases with short-term financing, lower-quality firms will not 
prefer to use more short-term debt and subject themselves to more monitoring. However, 
Mitchell (1991) disagreed with Flannery (1986) by highlighting the importance of 
transaction costs of short-term debt. He argued that lower-quality firms cannot afford 
high transaction costs of rolling over short-term debt as could high-quality firms. 
Consequently, lower-quality firms have to prefer long-term debts. In support of Mitchell 
(1991), Jun and Jen (2003) argued that a stronger and financially healthier firm can use 
more of short-term debt as the firm is likely to be less affected by refinancing and the 
interest risk. 
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We follow Barclay and Smith (1995) for the measurement of firm’s quality. Their 
proxy assumes that higher-quality firms normally have positive future abnormal profits. 
Abnormal profit is the difference between current earnings and one period lagged 
earnings. Since year to year fluctuations in percentage terms may be arbitrary and 
confusing for the debt-maturity regressions, this is why a firm’s quality is proxied by a 
variable QUALITYi which takes the value of 1 if a firm has positive abnormal profit in 
most of the sampled years, otherwise 0.  
 
2.2.  Testable Hypotheses 
In view of the above theoretical framework and empirical evidences, the following 
set of testable hypotheses is developed where only the alternative hypotheses are listed. 
The null hypotheses can be derived in usual manner where no relationship is expected 
between the explained and the explanatory variables. 
The following set of testable hypotheses is developed for debt-maturity ratios of 
listed firms. 
H1 Short-term financing ratio is higher in districts where judicial efficiency is low. 
H2 In districts where judicial efficiency is low, small firms have higher short-term 
financing ratios than large firms. 
H3 In districts where judicial efficiency is low, firms with little collaterals have 
higher short-tem financing ratios than firms with more collateral. 
H4 Growing firms have higher short-term financing ratio than non-growing firms in 
districts where judicial efficiency is low.  
H5 Judicial inefficiency has greater negative impact on the debt-maturity ratios of 
firms with more volatile cash flows than on debt-maturity ratios of firms with 
stable cash flows. 
H6 Debt-maturity ratio increases with the size of the firm. 
H7 Firms with more collaterals have higher debt-maturity ratios. 
H8 Growth opportunities decreases debt-maturity ratio. 
H9 debt-maturity ratios is negatively associated with volatility of firm’s cash flows. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Sample and Data Sources 
The sample of years for judicial statistics is primarily determined by the 
availability of data on judicial districts. The four provincial High courts resumed the 
publication of their annual reports in the year 2001, while this practice was discontinued 
for several years. At most, annual reports of the High courts could be obtained up to the 
year 2003. Hence in this study, the sample period for judicial statistics is from 2001 to 
2003. Judicial districts to be included in the sample were determined by location of the 
head offices of the listed firms. Out of a total of 104 judicial districts, the listed firms 
were found to be concentrated in 27 districts. Expecting that judicial efficiency remains 
somehow constant in short period of time in a given district, a time series average of 
judicial efficiency ratio for each district was calculated based on its three years of judicial 
efficiency ratios. 
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The source for the financial data of listed firms is “Balance Sheet Analysis of 
Stock Exchange Listed Firms” a publication of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). To 
synchronise the financial data of firms with judicial statistics, the starting year of firms’ 
data was taken to be the year 2000. As it will be discussed in the coming paragraphs, the 
variables GROWTH and VOL needed to be calculated from the average of yearly change 
in total assets and profitability-to-total assets respectively, the year 2000 was taken as a 
base year for these calculations and was dropped in all other calculations. Resultantly, the 
financial data for listed firms come from the years 2001 to 2006.  
For the sample of firms to be included in the analysis, the study initially planned to 
include all listed firms. However, firms in financial industries were dropped as their 
capital structures and debt-maturity structures are totally different from non-financial 
firms. Also, to remove outliers, the study dropped all firm-year observations that were 
below 1 percentile or above 99 percentile. The study also removed firms that were 
presumably in financial distress as denoted by their negative equity figures. Specifically, 
firms were excluded that had the ratio of total-debt-to-total-assets above 0.95.  Finally an 
unbalanced panel of 370 firms with 1976 firm-year observations could be saved. 
 
3.2.  Measurement of Variables 
 
3.2.1. The Measure of Debt-maturity 
Empirically, different proxies have been used for debt-maturity. For example, 
some studies have used the ratio of debt maturing in more than one year and five years to 
total debt e.g. Ozkan (2000). Others have used the ratio of debt maturing in more than 3 
years to total debt [Barclay and Smith (1995); Varouj, et al. (2005)]. Given the structure 
of available data, this study can use only the ratio of debt maturing in more than one year 
to total debt because the State of Bank of Pakistan’s publication ‘Balance Sheet Analysis 
of Joint Stock Companies Listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange’ does not provide data 
on different maturities of debt. Thus the debt-maturity is the ratio of debt maturing in 
more than one year to total debt.  
 
3.2.2.  The Measure of Judicial Efficiency 
To measure judicial efficiency, previous studies have used mainly three types of 
proxies. In most of the cross-country studies that looked into the relationship of 
efficiency of justice and finance, [e.g. Modigliani and Perotti (1997); La Porta, et al. 
(1998); Kumar, et al. (1999); Giannetti (2001); Giannetti (2003)], the authors have used a 
subjective index either prepared by the authors themselves or by some international 
organisation like the Business International Corporations (BIC). 
In studies where judicial efficiency is measured within a single country, more 
objective measures of judicial efficiency have been used. For example, Fabbri and Padula 
(2004), Fabbri (2002) and Jappelli, et al. (2005) used either a ratio of pending cases to 
number of disposed-off cases or the ratio of pending cases to number of cases instituted 
in a one year. A similar proxy of judicial efficiency used by some studies is the ratio of 
pending cases per 1000 persons in a given district/province [Jappelli, et al. (2005)]. And 
a third proxy is the average time taken by the district/provincial court from the point of 
institution of cases up to the point of disposal of the same [Magri (2006)].  
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Options available to this study do not allow the use of the first proxy because 
judicial efficiency index like the one prepared by Business International Corporations is 
not available/suitable for districts in Pakistan. The study cannot use the third proxy as 
well because data on average time taken in deciding a case by a high court at district level 
is also not available.  Given these constraints, the study can only use the proxy of judicial 
efficiency where pending cases are normalised by some base figure like number of cases 
disposed off in a year, number of cases instituted in a year, or population of the given 
district. This study uses the following measure of judicial efficiency: 
year that during initiated  cases of Number
year the of end the at district given a in pending cases of Number
JE1   
Other possible proxies for judicial efficiency may include: 
year that during off-disposed cases of Number
year a of end the at district given a in pending cases of Number
JE2 
 
thousands in measured district the of Population
year the of end the at district given a in pending cases of Number
JE3 
 
thousands in measured district the of Population
present) are courts  such(where court banking in pending cases of Number
JE4   
Efficiency of the high court is expected to be lower if we get a higher value for JE 
because greater number of pending cases in relation to number of cases disposed-off, 
would indicate that the given high court is either slow in deciding cases or unable to meet 
the demand placed on it in comparison to other district high courts.  
As discussed above, another useful proxy of the efficiency of justice can be 
median time analysis which measures the average time taken by a district high court in 
solving a case from the point of institution of the case to the point of final decision. 
However, availability of data in Pakistan on the length of trials is the main constraint in 
the way of conducting such an analysis. Fortunately, research studies report that proxies 
of judicial efficiencies based on pending cases and median time are well correlated. For 
example, using data on 27 Italian districts, Jappelli, et al. (2005) report that measures like 
JE1 or JE2 have a correlation of 0.6 with a measure of judicial efficiency based on 
median time taken by a court in deciding a case. 
As mentioned above, the study uses the ratio of pending cases at the end of the 
year to cases initiated during a year. For simplicity, the JE1 is simply represented by JE 
in the rest of the paper. This measure is well correlated with the other measures of 
judicial efficiency, which indicates that any of these measures can be used to proxy for 
the efficacy of justice in Pakistan. 
3.2.3.  Measurement of Other Explanatory Variables 
The Table 1 presents names, measurement, and hypothesised signs of the 
explanatory and explained variables and the interaction terms in light of the discussion in 
the literature review. These proxies have been widely used in debt-maturity structure 
research. 
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Table 1 
Names and Measurement of the Variables 
Name of 
Variable Denoted by Measured by 
Debt-maturity DEMA Ratio of long-term liabilities to total liabilities 
SIZE SIZE Natural log of total assets 
Tangibility TANG Net fixed assets / total assets 
Growth1 GROWTH Average of annual percentage change  in total assets 
Growth2 MVBV Market value per share/ book value per share 
Volatility VOL Coefficient of variation of profitability 
Jud. Efficiency JE Ratio of pending cases at year’s end to disposed-off 
cases during the year 
QUALITY QUALITY Equals 1 if abnormal profit is positive in majority of 
years, otherwise zero 
S1×JE  S1 is equal to 1 if afirm is in the 1st quartile of SIZE, 
otherwise 0 
S2×JE  S2 is equal to 1 if afirm is between the 1st and the 
2nd  quartile of SIZE, otherwise 0 
S4×JE  S4 is equal to 1 if a firm is above the 3rd quartile of 
SIZE, otherwise 0 
T1×JE  T1 is equal to 1 if afirm is in the 1st quartile of 
TANG, otherwise 0 
T2×JE  T2 is equal to 1 if afirm is between the 1st and the 
2nd  quartile of TANG, otherwise 0 
T4×JE  T4 is equal to 1 if a firm is above the 3rd quartile of 
TANG, otherwise 0 
G1×JE  G1 is equal to 1 if MVBV is equal to or below the 1st 
quartile, otherwise 0 
G2×JE  G2 is equal to 1 if MVBV is between the 1st and the 
2nd  quartile, otherwise 0 
G4×JE  G4 is equal to 1 if MVBV is above the 3rd quartile, 
otherwise 0 
Quality×JE  Quality Equals 1 if abnormal profit is positive in 
majority of years, otherwise zero 
 
3.3.  Specification of the Models 
This study uses a panel data framework to analyse the relationship between 
proxies for firms’ financial decisions and a set of explanatory variables including judicial 
efficiency. Panel data has several distinct advantages over simple cross-sectional or time 
series data as discussed by Hsiao (1986). For example, panel data allows us to account 
for unobserved heterogeneity and provides us large data points that results in more 
degrees of freedom and lower collinearity among explanatory variables. The basic form 
of the regression equation is as follows: 
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itiitit zxy 
'  … … … … … … (1) 
Where i ranges from 1,2,3,4,…N and t ranges from 1,2,3,4,…T, hence yit is the debt-
maturity ratio of firm i at time t. x
’
it represents various explanatory variables. αz
’
i is 
individual effect and z
’
I denotes a constant term and captures all observable and 
unobservable variables. If z
’
i is constant across all cross-sectional units (i.e., the cross-
sectional units do not differ among themselves with respect to debt-maturity decisions 
and/or the constraints they face), then the pooled ordinary least squares(OLS) is a better 
option to use as OLS will provide consistent and efficient estimates of the coefficients of 
the explanatory variables under such assumptions.  
However, it is reasonable to expect that there will be systematic differences in the 
debt-maturity ratios of different firms because of industry effects, managers’ risk 
preferences, and/or different incentive structures available to some firms like government 
subsidised loans (e.g. export refinance scheme of the State Bank of Pakistan that is 
available only to exporters).  If these unobservable effects are not isolated, they will 
inflate the error term of regression like it happens in the case of omitted variables. To 
deal with such problems, panel data offers to use either fixed effects or random effects 
models. The fixed effects model can be specified in the following form: 
itiitit axy   … … … … … …  (2) 
Where αi= αz
’
i and captures the firms’ fixed effects that are constant over time but varies 
across cross-sectional units. Fixed-effects model is costly as it looses too many degrees of 
freedom due to the construction of dummy variables. Random effects models give 
efficient estimates if it can be assumed that the individual effects are not correlated with 
the included explanatory variables. Greene (2006) suggests that such a model under a 
panel data framework may be formulated as under: 
itiiiitit azEazazxy  ]}[{][
'''
 … … … … (3) 
This could be simplified to the form 
itiitit uaxy 
'
 … … … … … … (4) 
The above random effect formulation considers the ui to be group specific random 
element. 
To choose between fixed-effects model and random-effects model in an objective 
manner, Hausman (1978) suggested a test which has a null hypothesis that fixed effects 
and random effects estimators do not differ systematically. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, then the fixed effects model is the best one.   
Using the above panel data framework, the study estimates two types of regression 
equations. In a restricted model, first it is assumed that the influence of judicial efficiency 
is uniform on all firms. And then in a less restricted model, the study allows for the 
possibility that judicial efficiency has differential impact on the debt-maturity decisions 
of firms that are classified in quartiles on basis of their selected attributes. To avoid the 
problem of simultaneity, all such explanatory variables are lagged one period back 
excluding VOL and GROWTH. 
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Since this study tests mainly two hypotheses, the panel data models are first 
estimated without including the interaction terms between explanatory variables and JE 
(Baseline estimation). Then for testing the effect of interactions between explanatory 
variables and JE on debt-maturity ratios, differential panel data models are estimated by 
including interaction terms between JE and the explanatory variables (differential 
regressions). 
 
3.3.1.  Baseline Estimation 
Under the assumption that judicial efficiency has uniform effect on all firms, 
following restricted model is specified for the debt-maturity regressions.  
tiiii
iititiit
INDYRSJEQUALITY
VOLGRWOTHTANGSIZEaY




2715165
4,31,21,1
 … … (5)
 
Where Yit is the debt-maturity ratio for firm i at time t and SIZE, and TANG, are 
explanatory variables that have been lagged one period whereas GROWTH and VOL 
remain constant throughout the sample period for a given firm and hence does not need to 
be lagged. QUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has positive 
changes in its net income in most of the years; otherwise it takes the value of 0. JE is the 
measure of judicial efficiency.  YRS are five dummy variables for years with one 
reference category to capture aggregate shocks that affect all firms alike and hence 
remain constant across firms but vary across time. IND represents dummy variables for 
each industry. There are twenty-eight industries in the sample. All of these dummy 
variables are tested for their joint significance in each regression model.  
 
3.3.2.  Differential Impact of Judicial Efficiency 
In the less restricted model, it is assumed that the relationship between judicial 
efficiency and debt-maturity is not linear for all firms as discussed in detail in the 
theoretical framework section. To check this possibility, this study introduces interaction 
terms between the measures of judicial efficiency and dummy variables that are based on 
the quartiles of selected explanatory variables. For an explanatory variable, three dummy 
variables and one referent category are defined. Against the referent category the other 
variables are compared. For example, if we specify S3 as the 3rd quartile of the variable 
SIZE to be the referent category, the other three dummy variables S1, S2, S4 
corresponding to 1st , 2nd and 4th quartiles of the variable SIZE are defined as follows: 




otherwise 0
quartile 1st the in is value  SIZEif 1
S1  




otherwise 0
quartile 2nd the in is value  SIZEif 1
S2
 
.




otherwise 0
quartile 4th the in is value  SIZEif 1
S4  
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These definitions yield the following values for each of the SIZE quartiles: 
Quartile of SIZE S1 S2 S4 
1 1 0 0 
2 0 1 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 0 0 1 
 
The definitions and symbols of the dummy variables for the quartiles of other 
explanatory variables are given in Table 1. To avoid the problem of multicollinearity, 
interaction terms for all variables are not included in one regression model. Rather 
separate regressions are run to include interaction terms between a single explanatory 
variable and the JE. Each regression model is estimated twice this way; one for fixed 
effects and the other for random effects. All specifications include full set of dummy 
variables for years and industries.   
To test the differential effect of judicial efficiency on the debt-maturity decisions 
of firms that are classified into quartiles on the basis of their selected attributes, the study 
includes three interaction terms between the dummy variables based on quartiles of the 
selected variables and the measure of judicial efficiency. The missing variable, which is a 
reference category, is represented by the variable JE. Since this analysis is focused on 
knowing the impact of judicial efficiency on the debt-maturity decision of small and large 
firms, firm having more and less tangible assets etc., it will be better that the referent 
category is one of the middle quartiles dummy variables against which the interactive 
effects of the 1st and the 4th quartiles can be compared. This is why the 3rd quartile is 
selected to be referent category in all regression models.          
 
4.  REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
4.1.  Results of the Main Effects Model 
Table 2 reports the results of the main effects model where the dependent variable 
is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. First column of the table displays the names of 
the variable whereas the second and third columns report the coefficient of the fixed-
effects model and beta coefficients respectively. Beta coefficients have been calculated 
on the standardised value of the explanatory and the explained variables to show the 
relative importance of the explanatory variables on a standardised scale. The standard 
errors and t-statistics are the same for both the usual and beta-coefficients. Standard 
errors are shown in parenthesis with each explanatory variable. 
As expected, firm size has positive coefficient. Its beta coefficient shows that firm 
size has the largest economic impact on the firms’ debt-maturity ratios. For example, one 
standard deviation increase in firm size increases the debt-maturity ratio by 0.694 
standard deviations. This confirms to the well-established signalling and trade-off 
theories of debt-maturity structure.  
Similar to the effect of firm size on debt-maturity structure, the second variable 
TANG also has positive and statistically significant coefficient. Its coefficient in the 
fixed-effects model shows that 100 percentage points increase in the ratio of fixed assets-
to-total  assets  increases  the  debt-maturity  ratio by  13.6 percentage  points.  Its relative  
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Table 2 
Baseline Estimation 
Table 2 presents results of main effects models where debt-maturity ratio of 370 
KSE listed firms is regressed on a measure of judicial efficiency, JE, and other control 
variables over the period 2001-2006. The second and the third columns show coefficients 
of these variables from fixed effects model and their beta coefficients. Robust standard 
errors are given in parentheses.  The *, **, and *** show statistical significance at 1 
percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level respectively.  Lower part of the table 
presents R
2
, and F-statistics for fixed-effects model. The regression specification includes 
five dummy variables for years and twenty-seven dummy variables for industries. The 
explained variable DEMAit is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt.  SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. TANG is the value of net fixed assets over total assets. 
GROWTH is the average of annual percentage change in total assets. VOL is the 
coefficient of variation of PROF. QUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if a firm has positive abnormal profit in most of the sampled years; otherwise 0. JE is the 
ratio of pending cases at the end of the year to cases initiated during a year.  
Variables Fixed-Effects Beta-coefficients 
SIZEi,t-1 0.093(0.017)* 0.694(0.017)* 
TANGi,t-1 0.136(0.061)** 0.148(0.061)** 
GROWTHi −0.165(0.069)** −0.112(0.069)** 
VOLi 0.019(0.012) 0.108(0.012) 
QUALITY 0.005(0.034) 0.011(0.034) 
JEi −0.155(0.057)* −0.162(0.057)* 
Constant 0.01(0.122) 0.01(0.122) 
R
2 
–Within 0.0432  
   Between 0.1244  
   Overall 0.101  
F-Statistics 6.48 (0.00)  
 
economic significance is given by its beta coefficient which is 0.148, being third largest 
coefficient after SIZE and JE. This statistically and economically significant coefficient 
confirms the maturity-matching hypothesis.  
The variable GROWTHi has negative coefficient and is significant only 5 percent 
level. And the next two variables do not have any statistical significance. The results 
indicate that volatility of net income (VOL) and a firm’s quality (QUALITYi) are not 
associated with the maturity structure of the firm’s debt at reasonable level of statistical 
significance. Also their economic significance is the lowest among all explanatory 
variables. 
Finally, the coefficient of JE suggests that worsening judicial efficiency is 
associated with lower debt-maturity ratios. The relationship is significant at 1 percent 
level of significance. Besides the high statistical significance, the coefficient of JE is also 
economically large, being the second largest after SIZE. For example, one standard 
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deviation increase in judicial inefficiency results in 0.162 standard deviation decrease in 
the long-term debt-to-total-debt ratio. This confirms the hypothesis that lenders hesitate 
to extend long-term debt when judicial efficiency is low.  
 
4.2.  Results of Regressions with Interaction Terms 
To explore the possibility that worsening judicial efficiency does not impact all firms 
equally with respect to their debt maturity level, interaction terms among the selected 
explanatory variables and the measure of judicial efficiency are used in the next set of 
regressions. To avoid the problem of multi-collinearly, interaction terms for all variables are 
not included in one regression. Rather a separate regression is estimated to interact three 
dummy variables based on the quartile of a selected variable with the measure of judicial 
efficiency. The three dummy variables are based on the 1st, 2nd, and 4th
 
quartile of the 
included explanatory variables where the missing 3rd quartile serves as reference category. 
Since the variable QUALITY is a dummy variable, the concept of quartile does not apply here, 
which means that only one interaction terms is available for it. 
Results of these separate regressions are reported in Panel A and B of Table 3. The 
heads of the columns show the names of the variable for which the interaction terms have 
been included. Each regression specification includes five dummy variables for years and 
twenty-seven dummy variables for industries. The joint significance the years’ dummies 
and industries’ dummies is tested with Wald-test. In all regressions, all these dummy 
variables were found to be jointly significant at 1 percent. Wald-test is also applied to the 
interaction terms in each regression to test the joint significance of these interactions.  
Results of the Hausman test in all regression models indicated that fixed effects 
model better fit the data; random effects models are not estimated and reported for the 
sake of parsimony. Dummy variables for the third quartile of included variables are not 
included in the regression so that the missing quartile serves as a reference category, the 
coefficient of JE represents slope of judicial efficiency for firms in the third quartile of 
the given variable in all regressions of Panel A and B of Table 3. For example, coefficient 
of JE in Table 3 under the column SIZE is actually the slope of the judicial efficiency for 
firms belonging to the third quartile of SIZE. 
Coefficients of the interaction terms like S1*JE, S2*JE and S4*JE are the 
incremental slopes of judicial efficiency above (if coefficient of the interaction term is 
positive) or below (if coefficient of the interaction term is negative) the slope of JE. 
Similar interpretations apply to other variables in their respective columns.  
The differential slopes of the interaction term S1*JE and S4*JE are significantly 
different from the reference category at 1 percent level of significance. Coefficients of the 
first two interaction terms, S1*JE and S2*JE, are negative while coefficient of the last 
interaction term S4*JE is positive. As mentioned above, JE represents the coefficient of 
JE for firms belonging to the 3rd
 
quartile of SIZE. The coefficient of JE is –0.144 
indicating that 100 percentage points drop in judicial efficiency reduces debt-maturity 
ratio of firms in the 3rd quartile of SIZE by 14.4 percentage points. This effect is severe 
for firms that belong to the 1st quartile of SIZE. This is evident from the differential 
coefficient of S1*JE, which is −0.072. This negative coefficient suggests that worsening 
judicial efficiency has an additional negative effect of 7.2 percentage points on the    
debt-maturity  ratio of  firms in the  1st quartile of SIZE as compared to its effect on debt- 
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Table 3 
Panel A – Differential Impact of JE on Debt-Maturity 
Panel A and Panel B present results of regression models with interaction terms where 
debt-maturity ratio of 370 KSE listed firms is regressed on a measure of judicial 
efficiency, JE, firm-specific variables, and the interaction terms between quartile 
dummies of the explanatory variables and the variable JE over the period 2001-2006. 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.  The *, **, and *** show statistical 
significance at 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level respectively.  Lower 
part of the table presents R
2
, and F-statistics for fixed-effects model. The regression 
specification includes five dummy variables for years and twenty-seven dummy variables 
for industries. The explained variable DEMAit is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt.  
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. TANG is the value of net fixed assets over 
total assets. GROWTH is the average of annual percentage change in total assets. VOL is 
the coefficient of variation of PROF. QUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm has positive abnormal profit in most of the sampled years; otherwise 0. JE is 
the ratio of pending cases at the end of the year to cases initiated during a year.  
Variables SIZE TANG GROWTH 
SIZEi,t-1 0.07(0.018)* 0.087(0.018)* 0.093(0.017)* 
TANGi,t-1 0.125(0.06)** 0.092(0.063) 0.136(0.061)** 
GROWTHi −0.175(0.07)* −0.262(0.072)* 0.000(0.00) 
VOLi 0.006(0.015) 0.024(0.012)*** −0.04(0.02)** 
QUALITY −0.001(0.032) 0.013(0.035) 0.005(0.034) 
JEi −0.144(0.05)* −0.206(0.056)* −0.012(0.164) 
S1×JE −0.072(0.029)* 
  S2×JE −0.02(0.015) 
  S4×JE 0.063(0.018)* 
  T1×JE 
 
−0.046(0.02)** 
 T2×JE 
 
−0.029(0.012)** 
 T4×JE 
 
0.069(0.013)* 
 GT×JE 
  
0.056(0.08) 
G2×JE 
  
0.077(0.061) 
G4×JE 
  
0.11(0.115) 
Constant 0.073(0.076) 0.073(0.076) 0.059(0.123) 
R
2
 - Within 0.0597 0.0432 0.0774 
        Between 0.1234 0.1244 0.2029 
        Overall 0.1019 0.101 0.1709 
F-Statistics 5.10 (0.00) 5.52 (0.00) 4.20 (0.00) 
 
maturity ratio of firms in the 3rd quartile of SIZE. The overall impact of judicial 
inefficiency on the debt-maturity of firms in the 1st quartile of SIZE is −21.6 percentage 
points (−14.4 −7.2).  This impact is far greater than the impact of worsening judicial 
efficiency on the debt-maturity ratios of firms in the 4th quartile of SIZE. For example, 
the impact of worsening judicial efficiency on debt-maturity of firms in the 4th quartile of 
SIZE is only −9.1 percentage points (−14.4 + 6.3). These findings are in line with the 
hypothesis that firm size reduces information asymmetries and serves as a proxy for the 
firm’s ability to absorb unexpected shocks. Such features of borrowers reduce the 
lenders’ concern about the adverse selection and subsequent borrowers’ delinquency.  
The differential coefficients in the third column of Table 3 for the variable TANG 
indicate almost similar results as discussed above. The results indicate that poor enforcement 
of contracts has smaller negative impact on the debt-maturity levels of firms that have more 
fixed assets-to-total assets as compared to firms that have less fixed assets-to-total assets. For 
example, the overall impact of judicial inefficiency on the debt-maturity level is only −0.137 
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for firms in the 4th quartile of TANG whereas it is −0.252, −0.235, and −0.206 for firms in the 
1st, 2nd and 3rd quartile of TANG respectively.  These results indicate that firms having more 
fixed assets as a percentage of total assets are affected less by worsening judicial efficiency.  
The variable GROWTH was dropped by the econometric software STATA when 
interaction terms of its quartiles were included. This may be because of high collinearity 
between GROWTH and its interaction terms. To test it in an alternative way, a dummy 
GT variable was created based on the 50th percentile of GROWTH. GT assumed a value 
of 1 if a firm had a GROWTH value of more than the 50th percentile of GROWTH, 
otherwise 0. GT was interacted with the JE. A separate regression was estimated to 
include this interaction term GT*JE instead of including the dummy variables based on 
the quartiles of GROWTH. Results of the regression showed that GT*JE has a negative 
and statistically significant value of −0.298. However, the main variable GROWTH 
showed an insignificant coefficient. Thus growth opportunities and their interaction terms 
do not present a clear picture in the differential equation of debt-maturity structure.  
The last two variables, reported in Panel B of Table 3, do not show consistent      
or significant results as  well.  For  example,  the  coefficient  of  VOL  is  not  statistically  
 
Table 3 
Panel B: Differential Impact of JE on Debt-Maturity 
Panel B present results of regression models with interaction terms where debt-maturity 
ratio of 370 KSE listed firms is regressed on a measure of judicial efficiency, JE, firm-
specific variables, and the interaction terms between quartile dummies of VOL and 
QUALITY and the variable JE over the period 2001-2006. Robust standard errors are 
given in parentheses.  The *, **, and *** show statistical significance at 1 percent level, 5 
percent level, and 10 percent level respectively.  Lower part of the table presents R
2
, and 
F-statistics for fixed-effects model. The regression specification includes five dummy 
variables for years and twenty-seven dummy variables for industries. The explained 
variable DEMAit is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt.  SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of total assets. TANG is the value of net fixed assets over total assets. GROWTH is the 
average of annual percentage change in total assets. VOL is the coefficient of variation of 
PROF. QUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has positive 
abnormal profit in most of the sampled years; otherwise 0. JE is the ratio of pending 
cases at the end of the year to cases initiated during a year.  
 VOL QUALITY 
SIZEi,t-1 0.093(0.017)* 0.093(0.017)* 
TANGi,t-1 0.136(0.061)** 0.14(0.061)** 
GROWTHi –0.649(0.15)* −0.41(0.167)* 
VOLi 0.012(0.025) −0.047(0.027)*** 
QUALITY 0.005(0.034) −0.091(0.138) 
JEi 0.333(0.079)* 0.001(0.248) 
V1×JE −0.547(0.098)*  
V2×JE 0.009(0.039)  
V4×JE −0.173(0.062)*  
Q×JE  0.111(0.135) 
Constant −0.474(0.22)** 0.059(0.1)* 
  0.057(0.05) 
R
2
 - Within 0.0432 0.0439 
        Between 0.1244 0.1239 
        Overall 0.101 0.102 
F-Statistics  5.52 (0.00) 4.84 (0.00) 
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significant at any conventional level. Its interaction terms, though statistically significant, 
do not demonstrate a consistent pattern. Debt-maturity ratios of firm in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 
and 4th quartiles of VOL change by −0.214, 0.3339, 0.333, and 0.16 units when there is 
one unit positive change in the JE (positive change in JE shows deterioration in the 
efficiency of justice). And finally, neither the variable QUALITY nor its interaction term 
is significant at conventional levels of 1 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The main objectives of this paper was to quantify the effect of judicial efficiency 
on debt-maturity structure of firms listed at KSE and to highlight the importance of 
efficient judicial system for the development of capital markets. This paper accomplishes 
these objectives by analysing the impact of judicial efficiency and other firms-specific 
factors on debt-maturity structure of 370 KSE-listed non-financial firms over the period 
2001-2006. The baseline results show that large firms and firms with more tangible assets 
have more long-term debts whereas growing firms have more short-term debt. The results 
clearly indicate that debt-maturity decreases with inefficiency of judiciary; however, 
volatility of net income and firm’s quality do not show any statistically significant 
relationship with debt-maturity ratio. Results of regressions also show that worsening 
judicial efficiency has greater negative effect on debt-maturity of small firms than on 
debt-maturity of large firms. Similarly, worsening judicial efficiency has greater negative 
impact on the debt-maturity ratios of firms with fewer tangible assets than on firms with 
more tangible assets.  
 
Policy Implications 
Results of the regression models have important implications for financial 
deepening and capital-market development in Pakistan.
1
 Results suggest that inefficient 
judicial system not only reduces debt-maturity at aggregate level, but also has an 
additional negative impact on the debt-maturity ratios of small firms and firms with little 
collaterals. These results highlight the importance of judicial efficiency for small firms 
both in their capital structures and debt-maturity structures. Being unable to borrow and 
achieve optimum capital structure, small firms lose one important and cheaper sources of 
capital. Second, small firms under inefficient judicial system will find it difficult to 
borrow for the long-term. The excessive use of short-term financing may be very risky 
for small firms because their cash flows are more likely to fluctuate than those of large 
firms. Second, in developing countries like Pakistan, small firms are considered to be the 
engine of economic growth. Difficulty in accessing long-term financing means that their 
growth opportunities remain limited. In addition, if they finance long-term projects with 
short-term debts, it will create a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, 
increasing the chances of financial distress which will subject such firms to those many 
indirect costs of financial distress/bankruptcy like lower expenditure on research and 
development and employees training, deterioration in quality of goods and services and 
decline in sales. The inability of small firms to borrow optimally for exploiting growth 
opportunities will translate into economic stagnation of the overall economy. 
 
1The importance of financial system development and economic development has long been recognised 
and documented in the extant literature. For a survey of this literature, see Shah and Shah (2011). 
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Several measures can be suggested to mitigate the negative impact of judicial 
inefficiency. The first measure, of course, is to expedite the process of pending cases 
resolution at all levels of the high courts. Since this requires huge allocation of additional 
resources, one alternative is to focus specifically on the efficiency of banking courts. 
Banking courts are limited in number and hence can be targeted even with limited 
resources. Second, the network of banking courts can be increased to lighten the burden 
on the existing courts. In the meantime, as the results suggest that information availability 
about the borrowers plays an important role both in the debt-maturity decisions of 
creditors, information sharing among financial institution should be encouraged and 
banks credit monitoring systems should be strengthened.  At present, the Credit 
Information Bureau (CIB) is performing the duty of obtaining and disseminating 
information related to credit history of the borrowers. CIB is helpful in reducing the 
adverse selection problem; however, results of the study indicate that information 
unavailability is still a big issue in lending decisions. This highlights the need for 
improvement in the functioning of CIB. The second problem of information asymmetry 
i.e., moral hazards can be overcome by strengthening the monitoring system. 
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